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THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AS REFLECTING MAO TSE-TUNG'S INFLUENCE
SHAO-CHUAN LENG
During the heyday of the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1966-69) in the People's Republic of
China, Mao Tse-tung called for the "smashing
of Kung-chien-fa (public security, procurato-
rate, and judicial organs)"' and he was also
quoted as saying: "Depend on the rule of man,
not the rule of law."12 However, at the time of
the adoption of the 1975 Constitution of the
PRC, a statement made by Mao in 1954 received
special emphasis from Chinese spokesmen: "An
organization must have rules, and a state also
must have rules; the Constitution is a set of
general rules and is a fundamental charter."3
Moreover, following Mao's recent death, the
new Chinese leadership has frequently cited
the late Chairman's words to stress unity, disci-
pline, law and order.
4
1 Mao Tse-tung's 1967 instruction in CHUNG-EUNG
WEN-HUA TA-KE-MING CHUNG-YAO WEN-CHIEN HUI-
PIEN (Important Chinese Communist documents is-
sued during the Great Cultural Revolution) 209
(1973).
2 Completely Smash the Feudal, Capitalist and Revision-
ist Legal System, Canton Fan-Peng-Lo hei-hsien (Anti-
Peng and Lo's Black line) (No. 2., 1968). English
translation can be found in U.S. Consulate-General,
Hong Kong, SELECTIONS FROM CHINA MAINLAND
MAGAZINE (S.C.M.M.), 23 (No. 625, 1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as S.C.M.M.].3 See, e.g., Chang Chun-chiao, Report of the Revision
of the Constitution, DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST SESSION
OF THE FOURTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 33 (1975).
1 In a speech eulogizing Mao on September 18,
1976, Hua Kuo-feng urged the whole country to
follow the late Chairman's often-heard "three do's
and three don'ts" instruction: "Practice Marxism,
and not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open
and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire."
Memorial speech by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng, 19 PEKING
REV. 16 (No. 39, 1976). The same admonition of
Mao was repeated in a joint editorial of the People's
Daily, the Liberation Army Daily, and the Red Flag
on October 10, 1976, to underline the appeal of
"upholding the unity and unification of the Party,
strengthening sense of organization and discipline,
and obeying the Party Central Committee headed by
Comrade Hua Kuo-feng." Common Aspirations of
Hundreds of Millions of People, Jen-min jih-pao (Peo-
ple's Daily) (Peking) Oct. 10, 1976, at 1 [hereinafter
Whatever the reasons for Mao's statements,
and whatever the reasons for others to quote
them, there is little doubt about the magnitude
of Mao's impact on the Chinese legal system.
This paper will attempt to examine the extent
to which Mao has influenced the Chinese legal
system. This influence will be examined in
terms of the competition of two models of law,
the class nature of people's justice, law as an
instrument for social engineering, the implica-
tions of the Anti-Confucian and Pro-Legalist
Campaign, and trends for the future. s
COMPETITION OF Two MODELS OF LAW
Two models of law have coexisted and com-
peted with each other in the People's Republic
of China. One may be called the jural (formal)
model, and the other the societal (informal)
model. 6 Just as Fa (positive law) and Li (moral
code) coexisted in traditional China to regulate
human behavior and social order, so do the
jural and societal models of law coexist in
contemporary China. Moreover, formal rules
cited asJ.M.J.P.]. The authorities in Hunan Province
(Mao's native province) are also reported to have
called on the populace to sing a song entitled "The
Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for
Attention." The song represents the "iron discipline"
worked out by Mao for the Red Army in the early
years of revolution. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1976, at A
10, col. 1.
5 My sources consist of documentary materials and
interviews with recent Chinese emigres, some of
whom were former Communist cadres and others of
whom had some personal experience with people's
justice.
6 Most authors seem to agree on the existence of
two models of law in the PRC, although using differ-
ent labels to describe them. See, e.g., J. COHEN, THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION (1968); SHAO-
CHUAN LENG, JUSTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA: A
SURVEY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE CHINESE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1967) [hereinafter cited as LENa];
Li, The Role of Law in Communist China, 1970 CHINA
Q. 66 (No. 44); Lubman, Form and Function in the
Chinese Criminal Process, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 535
(1969); Lung-Sheng Tao, Politics and Law Enforcement
in China: 1949-1970, 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 713 (1974).
356
Vol. 68, No. 3
Printed in U.S.A.
PRC LAW AND MAO TSE-TUNG'S INFLUENCE
have played a secondary role in each instance.7
Reflecting Soviet and Western influence, the
jural model stands for formal, elaborate, and
codified rules enforced by a centralized and
institutionalized bureaucracy. The societal
model, on the other hand, focuses on socially
approved norms and values, implemented by
political socialization and enforced by social
pressures.
Although labelled the Communist Chinese
equivalent of Confucian Li, the informal model
represents a distinctly Maoist approach to law.
The proper modes of conduct based on the
collective ethics of an egalitarian society are
communicated to the people through education
and mass participation in the political-legal
process. Compliance is secured by the individ-
ual's internalization of social norms and by
community pressure and coercion. The formal
sanctioning process of the state comes into play
only in serious cases of deviance.
Because of his anti-bureaucratic bias and
mass-line orientation, Mao preferred informal-
ity and flexibility in handling political and legal
issues.8 While recognizing the need for a legal
system in a society, he nevertheless considered
law merely as a useful tool to political ends and
would not let formal rules and procedures
hinder the interest of the revolution. As early
as 1926, he articulated his mass revolutionary
method by saying that "proper limits have to
7 For a discussion of law in traditional China, see
D. BODDS & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA
(1967); CHU TUNG-TSU, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADI-
TIONAL CHINA (1961); S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS IN MAINLAND CHINA (1962).
s The mass line is a fundamental Party principle
of leadership, expounded by Mao, requiring party
cadres to be integrated with the masses and to lead
the masses in implementing the Party's policy. Epito-
mized by the phrase "from the masses, to the masses,"
it prescribes a process of learning the masses' views,
"concentrating" them into policy decisions, and
bringing those decisions back to the masses for imple-
mentation. Mao Tse-tung, Some Questions Concerning
Methods of Leadership, 3 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO
TSE-TUNG 117-22 (1967). In terms of work style, the
mass line embodies the Maoist preference for mobi-
lizing mass participation in policy execution through
nongovernmental organization and activities. The
emphasis is on direct popular action rather than
bureaucratic administration. For a good discussion
of the mass line, see J. LEwIs, LEADERSHIP IN COM-
MUNIST CHINA, 70-100 (1964); J. TOWNSEND, POLITI-
CAL PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 72-74
(1967). Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dis-
pute Resolution in Communist China, 55 CALIF. L. REv.
1303-05 (1967).
be exceeded in order to right a wrong, or else
the wrong cannot be righted."9 During the
Kiangsi Soviet period of 1931-1934, the Chinese
Soviet Republic under the direction of the
Moscow-oriented "returned students group"
enacted a number of basic laws and established
a system of "people's courts" including some
elaborate judicial procedures.10 As the Kuom-
intang threat increased in 1933, both Mao Tse-
tung and Chang Wen-t'ien maintained that
local authorities should have more freedom
and power in dealing with counter revolution-
aries. Chang expressed this view in an essay
advising judicial cadres not to be concerned
with the "niceties of legal procedures and pro-
visions" but with the "creation of our laws
according to revolutionary needs in the course
of brutal class struggle.""1 During the Yenan
period, when the Chinese Communist Party
was under Mao's undisputed leadership, there
appeared, on the one hand, a tendency in the
Communist-held area to regularize the judicial
structure and process. On the other hand,
there were moves to refine and popularize
mass line techniques in applying sanctions and
settling disputes. These techniques included
on-the-spot trials and mass trials to mobilize
and educate the masses and also the develop-
ment of mediation as an effective means for
resolving civil and minor criminal cases.
12
In the years immediately following the
founding of the Chinese People's Republic in
1949, the dual models of law continued to
operate in a complementary yet competitive
manner. A uniform, nation-wide court system
was being developed along with the promulga-
tion of such statutes as the Land Reform Law
and the Marriage Law. At the same time,
justice was often carried out by ad hoc people's
tribunals, mass trials, or public security organs
(the police) in the form of large scale political
9Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement,
I SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 27 (1954).
10 LENG, supra note 6, at 3-5.
" Lo Fu (Chang Wen-t'ien), Be Merciless Toward
Our Class Enemies, ToU-CHENG (Struggle) 3 (No. 49,
March 2, 1934). For a detailed discussion of the work
of suppressing counterrevolutionaries in the Kiangsi
Soviets, see P. GRIFFIN, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
TREATMENT OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES: 1924-
1949 11 (1976) and TSAO Po-i, KIANGSI SU-WEI-AI
CHIH CHIEN-LI CHI CH'I PENG-KUEI (The rise and fall
of the Chinese Soviet in Kiangsi) 394-51 (1969).
I2 LENG, supra note 6, at 15-19; GRIFFIN, supra
note 11, at 88-92.
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campaigns."2 As China adopted the Soviet style
of economic development in 1953, there was a
general swing toward institutionalization and
bureaucratic normalization. In what may be
called the era of the PRC's constitutional exper-
iment, 1954-1957, the ascendency of the jural
model was marked by the adoption of a consti-
tution, organic legislation for the courts and
procuracy, and a series of substantive and pro-
cedural laws and regulations. Equality before
the law, the right of legal defense, protection
against arbitrary arrest, and independence of
the judiciary were guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion and other documents. Efforts were also
made to draft civil, criminal, and procedural
codes. 14 It is true that even in this period there
was a continued informalization and politiciza-
tion of the legal work.15 But an important
trend was started toward more regularity and
institutionalization. At the Eighth National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in
September 1956, Liu Shao-ch'i, then Vice
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee, spoke of the reasons for
regularizing the legal system. He said, "now
... the period of revolutionary storm and
stress is past, new relations of production have
been set up, and the aim of our struggle is
changed into one of safeguarding the success-
ful development of the productive forces of
society; a corresponding change in the methods
of struggle will consequently have to follow,
and a complete legal system becomes an abso-
lute necessity."1 6 Similarly, the speech given by
Tung Pi-wu, then President of the Supreme
13 The Land Reform Three-Anti, Five-Anti, and
Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Movements
were among those nation-wide mass campaigns
launched during 1950-1952. See LENG, supra note 6,
at 35-39 and Tao, supra note 6, at 715-20.
14 For details of the PRC's constitutional experi-
ment in the 1950's, see COHEN, supra note 6, at 10-
14; LENG, supra note 6, at 47-54; TAO-TAI HSIA,
GUIDE TO SELECTED SOURCES OF MAINLAND CHINA
1-76 (1967). English text of the 1954 Constitution is
in CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (1954). Articles 73 to 103 contained provisions
for the courts, procuracy and rights of the people.
11 Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party and Judicial
Independence: 1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. REV. 967 (1969);
Li, supra note 6, at 80-88; Lubman, supra note 6, at
546-51.
16 Liu Shao-ch'i, The Political Report of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Eighth
National Congress of the Party, 1 EIGHTH NATIONAL
CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 82
(1962) (Documents).
People's Court, and the resolution adopted by
the Central Committee at the Eighth Congress
emphasized the need for codification and for
observance of the law.17 Mao Tse-tung, never-
theless, appeared to be less enthusiastic. In his
speech before the same Congress he warned
his party of the evil of bureaucratism and the
danger of becoming isolated from the masses.16
China's progress toward a stable legal order
came to an abrupt end in 1957 when the Com-
munist elites launched an Anti-Rightist cam-
paign as a counter attack against strong criti-
cisms of the Party evoked by the Hundred
Flowers Movement.1 9 Even more far-reaching
was the PRC's decision to abandon the Soviet
model in favor of the Maoist developmental
strategy (the Great Leap Forward) that stressed
mass mobilization and "politics in command ."20
The impact on the legal field was a decisive
shift from thejural model to the societal model.
During the retrenchment years of the early
1960's, when Liu Shao-ch'i was the head of
state, there was an occasional reappearance of
legal discussions in juridical circles. 21 On the
17 Speech by Comrade Tung Pi-wu, 2 EIGHTH NA-
TIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CHINA 87 (1962) (Speeches); Resolution of the Eighth
National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the
Political Report of the Central Committee, I EIGHTH
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CHINA 128-29 (1962) (Documents).
Is Mao Tse-tung, Opening Address at the Eighth Na-
tional Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1
EIGHTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CHINA 9 (1956) (Speeches).
19 For a general discussion of the Hundred Flowers
Movement, see M. GOLDMAN, LITERARY DISSENT IN
COMMUNIST CHINA, 152-202 (1967); THE HUNDRED
FLOWERS CAMPAIGN AND THE CHINESE INTELLEC-
TUALS (R. MacFarquhar ed. 1960). For a discussion
of the criticism of the PRC's legal system by Chinese
jurists, see SHAO-CHUAN LENG, supra note 6 at 57-63.
20 The Great Leap Forward was designed to accel-
erate economic growth and socialist transformation
by stressing the mass line approach and the strategy
of "walking on two legs" -simultaneous development
of agriculture and industry and of indigeneous (labor
intensive) and modern (capital intensive) projects.
See A. ECKSTEIN, COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND FOREIGN TRADE, 29-37 (1966); J. PRY-
BYLA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST
CHINA 256-340 (1970); F. SHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND
ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA, 464-500 (1968).
21 For instance, in the early 1960's legal forums
were held, and books and articles were written on
such subjects as "philosophy of law," "state and legal
theories," "history of Chinese law," etc. The 1962
issues of chen-fa yen-chiu (Political-legal studies),
Peking [hereinafter cited as C.F.Y.C.] in particular,
(Vol. 68
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whole, however, the post 1957 trend continued
to show the decline of the judiciary and procur-
acy in importance and the ever-expanding role
of Party committees and public security organs
in law enforcement.
22
The jural model suffered another serious
setback during the Cultural Revolution (1966-
69). The Cultural Revolution was initiated by
Mao largely to revolutionalize the bureaucratic
establishment and to inculcate socialist values
and beliefs. One of the targets under attack
was the existing legal structure, which the Red
Guards labelled as a counterrevolutionary cre-
ation of Liu Shao-ch'i and his fellow "capitalist
roaders." Among others, the Maoists criticized
Liu's group for supporting the "bourgeois"
systems of "equaljustice" and "defense counsel"
and for resisting "leadership of the Party over
legal work."23 Following Mao's instruction to
"smash Kung-chien-fu (Police, procuracy, and
courts)," the Red Guards singled out the public
security for special denouncement.2 4 The latter
contained many serious articles on legal questions.
LENG, supra note 6, at 72-73: A former prominent
Chinese lawyer told the author that he was asked in
1954 by the Ministry of Communications to prepare
a draft on maritime law. He completed the final
draft in the early 1960's as a member of the Codifica-
tion Committee. The entire project ended when the
Cultural Revolution was launched in 1966. However,
his lectures on maritime law were published by the
People's Publishing House in the 1960's for internal
circulation among organs concerned with shipping.
22 For an illustration of the Party-controlled and
police-administered sanctioning process during the
period between the late 1950's and the mid-1960's,
see A. BARNETT, CADRES, BUREAUCRACY AND POLIT-
ICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST CHINA, 219-44 (1967); J.
COHEN, supra note 6, at 23-46; BAo RUO-WANG (J.
Pasqualini) & R. CHELMINSKI, PRISONER OF MAO
(1973).
2 Completely Smash the Feudal, Capitalist, and Revi-
sionist Legal Systems, supra note 23-28. See also L.
DrIrMER, Liu SHAO-CH'I AND THE CHINESE CUL-
TURAL REVOLUTION 222-23 (1974); Tao-tai Hsia, The
Tenth Party Congress and Future Development of Law in
China, in HOUSE COMM. FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OIL
AND ASIAN RIVALS, SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT-JAPAN
AND THE OIL CRISIS, HEARINGS BEFORE SUB-COMM.
ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 93rd Cong., 1st &
2nd Sess. (1973-74); Li, supra note 6, at 104-09.
24 Mao's instructions issued in 1967 in CHUNG-
RUNG WEN HUA TA-KE-MING CHUNG-TAO WEN-CHIEN
HIU-PIEN, supra note 1, at 209. Chiang ching, Mao's
wife, is reported to have demanded in 1968 that the
three organs, especially the public security, be com-
pletely smashed. S.C.M.M. 16 (No. 625, 1968); SUR-
VEY OF CHINA MAINLAND PRESS 9 (No. 4182, 1968)
(U.S. Consulate Hong Kong) [hereinafter cited as
S.C.M.P.].
was attacked for abuse of power and for taking
a reactionary stand. Moreover, its cadres were
accused of failing to carry out the mass line
according to the teachings of Mao Tse-tung.'
In an editorial titled "In Praise of Lawlessness,"
the People's Daily called for the complete de-
struction of the "bourgeois" law so that the
proletarian legal order could be established.
2 6
To achieve the transformation of political-
legal organs, Mao proceeded to have a large
number of cadres purged without resort to any
formal process. Among many law enforcement
personnel removed from office were Yang
Hsiu-feng, President of the Supreme People's
Court, Chang Ting-cheng, the Chief Procura-
tor, and Hsiu Tzu-jung, the First Deputy Min-
ister of Public Security. 7 Liu Shao-ch'i, the
primary target of the Cultural Revolution, was
deprived of his post as the Chairman of the
People's Republic of China by the decision of
the Central Committee of the Chinese Com-
munist Party in disregard of constitutional pro-
cedure .28
The reform of the law enforcement appara-
tus during the Cultural Revolution was also
accomplished through the wider use of mass
line devices and the imposition of military con-
trol over "Kung-chien-fa" by the People's Lib-
eration Army (PLA).29 The courts still existed
I Comrade Hsieh Fu-chieh Important Speech (ex-
cerpts), Canton Chiu-P'eng-Lo Chan-Po (Drag-out
P'eng-Lo Combat News), (No. 3, Feb. 1968) in
S.C.M.P. 5-7 (No. 4138, 1968); Suppression of the
Masses is Bourgeois Dictatorship, Shanghai Wen-hui
Pao, June 5, 1968, in S.C.M.P., 1-7 (No. 4210, 1968).
28 S.C.M.P. 13 (No. 3879, 1967).
21 S.C.M.P. 1 (No. 4181, 1968); S.C.M.P. 1 (No.
4182, 1968); Hungdah Chiu, The Judicial System under
the PRC Constitution, in THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF
COMMUNIST CHINA: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES 86 (M.
Lindsay ed. 1976); CHANG CHING-WEI, KUNG-FEI
CHENG-CHIH WEN-TI LUN-CHI (Collection of essays on
Chinese Communist political problems), 158-59, 327-
28 (1965).
' Liu was expelled from the CCP "for all time"
and stripped of all his state posts by the decision of
the Party. See Communique of the Twelfth Enlarged
Plenum of the Eighth CC of the CCP, Oct. 31, 1968, in
J.M.J.P. Nov. 2, 1968, at 1. However, the right to
remove the head of state was reserved to the National
People's Congress by Article 28 of the 1954 Constitu-
tion of the PRC.
I The PLA began its intervention in early 1967 by
taking over the public security bureaus. See, e.g.,
Notice of the Public Security Ministry and the Peking
Garrison Command of the PLA on Taking over Control of
the Peking Municipal Public Security Bureau by the Peking
Garrison Command of the PLA, Feb. 11, 1967, CURRENT
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but functioned only sparingly. There were oc-
casional reports of participation of the people's
courts in the judicial process . 0 More often
there were reports of publicjudgment meetings
or mass trials held against counterrevolution-
aries, class enemies, or common criminals,
where judgments were rendered and sanctions
imposed by "political and legal organs,"3 "or-
gans of dictatorship, ' 32 "revolutionary commit-
tees," 33 "police-procurate-court organs" 4 or
"military control committees. 3 5
Available evidence indicates that the PLA's
supervision of the administration ofjustice con-
tinued beyond 1969. It was only between 1970
and 1973 that military control over law enforce-
ment gradually receded, although the pace
varied from region to region and from agency
to agency. For instance, public notices an-
nouncing sentences against criminals were is-
sued in 1971 by the military control committees
of the PLA for the police, procuracy and courts
BACKGROUND 124 (No. 852, 1968) (U.S. Consulate-
General, Hong Kong) [hereinafter cited as C.B.].
Later Military control was extended to "all organs of
dictatorship." See Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih's Talk at
the Supreme People's Court (Excerpts), Hung tien hsien
(Red Telegraph Dispatch), March 27, 1968 (No. 3),
in S.C.M.P. 4 (No 4157, 1968).
o E.g., Kwangtung People's Broadcasting Station,
November 10, 1967, reported that the Kwangtung
Provincial Higher People's Court and the Canton
Municipal Higher People's Court sentenced twelve
counterrevolutionaries to death or imprisonment;
New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.) Sept. 12, 1967
[hereinafter cited as N.C.N.A.], reported a Peking
Intermediate People's Court sentenced four criminals
to death. According to both reports, the death sen-
tences were approved by the Supreme People's
Court. This procedure was also followed after the
Chengchou Municipal Military Control Committee
of the Public Security Organ had sentenced several
individuals to death (Hunan People's Broadcasting
Station, May 12, 1968).
31 E.g., Shangtung People's Broadcasting Station,
Sept. 5, 1957; Yunnan People's Broadcasting Station,
March 15, 1968.
" E.g., Hunan People's Broadcasting Station, Nov.
8, 1967; Tsingtao People's Broadcasting Station,
March 5, 1968.
13 E.g., Kwangtung People's Broadcasting Station,
March 15, 1968; Checkiang People's Broadcasting
Station, Aug. 31, 1968.
3 4 E.g., Shanghai People's Broadcasting Station,
May 14, 1968.
5 Inner Mongolia People's Broadcasting Station,
April 27, 1968; Kiangsi People's Broadcasting Station,
May 14, 1968; Honan People's Broadcasting Station,
May 12, 1968.
in various parts of Yunnan province, 36 while at
reported trials in Peking and Canton in 1970,
people's courts passed sentences. 7 Public secu-
rity organs are reported to have resumed their
duties in 1971 in large cities, 38 but two docu-
ments, dated August 1972 and March 1973,
show that the PLA still exercised military con-
trol over police in Yunnan.9 In general, "nor-
malcy" appears to have been restored to the
legal field by 1973. The courts thus appear to
have survived the Cultural Revolution. Less
fortunate was the procuracy, which was abol-
ished, its functions and powers having been
transferred to the public security agency.
40
What has emerged from the Cultural Revo-
lution is the ascendency of the societal model
of law over the jural model and the more
explicit dominance of the Party and the police
in the administration of justice.4 In a larger
context, the balancing of the two competing
lines- institutionalization and the mass line- is
evident in the new Constitution adopted in
I January 16 Notice by the Military Control Com-
mittee of Kunmin City, January 26 Notice by the
Military Control Committee of Chinghung County,
and February 12 Notice by the Military Control Team
of Pan-lung District. Copies of these unpublished
documents are in the possession of the author.
37 For radio reports and witnesses' accounts of a
mass trial held in Peking in January 1970 and two
other trials held in Canton in May 1970, see Trial by
Jury-Mainland Style, Hong Kong Standard, Aug. 23,
1970, at 6.
3 This is true especially in such cities as Peking
and Canton. See Security Returns to Its Duties, South
China Morning Post (Hong Kong), April 8, 1971, at
15. This was confirmed by several Chinese inform-
ants who left China after 1973.
39 Notice of the Chinese People's Liberation Army
Military Control Section of the Public Security Or-
gans of Meng-lien County in Yunnan Province (Aug.
8, 1972) and Notice of the Chinese PLA Military
Control Committee of Szu-Mao Region in Yunnan
Province (March 5, 1973). Copies of both documents,
which pronounced sentences upon a number of class
enemies, are in the possession of the author. English
translation of the first document is in Hungdah
Chiu, supra note 27, at 108-10.
" Id. at 91-92. According to Chinese spokesmen,
the procuracy was abolished in order "to simplify,
improve and transform the superstructure which was
not suitable to socialist economic basis, and to simplify
the procedure in the jurisdictional sphere for the
convenience of the masses." Ruge, An Interview with
Chinese Legal Officials, 1975 CHINA Q. 120 (No. 61).
41 For a comprehensive treatment of China's legal
development in the post-1966 period, see a forthcom-
ing study by Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu.
[Vol. 68
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1975.42 On the one hand, the Constitution con-
tains provisions weighted toward discipline and
orderly economic development. 3 On the other,
it includes statements reflecting unequivocally
Mao Tse-tung's mass politics and anti-bureau-
cratism .44
As far as law is concerned, the new Constitu-
tion clearly confirms the political reality of the
consistent decline of the jural model in China
since 1957. There is a drastic reduction in the
number of the provisions concerning citizens'
fundamental rights, from 19 articles (Articles
85-103) in the 1954 Constitution to 4 articles
(Articles 26-29) in the 1975 Constitution."s Even
more dramatic is the reduction in the coverage
of the judicial system, from 12 articles (Articles
73-84) in the old Constitution to one article
(Article 25) in the present Constitution. Elimi-
nated are provisions containing such "bour-
geois" concepts of due process as equality be-
fore the law, public trials, right to defense,
and protection against arbitrary arrest.46 Also
dropped was the controversial provision pro-
viding for judicial independence.4 7 Underscor-
42 The text of the 1975 Constitution can be found
in DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FOURTH
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 3, at 5-29. For a detailed
analysis of the Constitution, see Lindsay, supra note
27; TAo-TAI HSIA AND K. HAUN, THE 1975 REVISED
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(1975).43 E.g., Articles 7, 8, 9, and 10 on the economy
and the last part of Article 13 referring to "both
centralism and democracy, both discipline and free-
dom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind
and liveliness."
4E.g., Article 11 stressing proletarian politics, the
mass line, and the principle of efficient and simple
administration; Article 13 permitting the masses
"speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great
debates and writing big-character posters." It was
reported that the inclusion of the freedom to strike
in Article 28 was done at Mao Tse-tung's personal
insistence. Chang Chun-chiao, supra note 3, at 39-40.
4 Text of the 1954 Constitution is in CONSTITUTION
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 14.
4E.g., Articles 76 and 85 of the 1954 Constitution.
Article 89 of the 1954 Constitution that stipulated
"no citizen may be arrested except by decision of a
people's court or with the sanction of a people's
procuratorate" is now replaced by Article 28 of the
1975 Constitution that provides "no citizen may be
arrested except by decision of a people's court or
with the sanction of a public security organ." This
actually means no restriction on the arrest power of
the police.
47 Article 78 of the 1954 Constitution.
ing the prevailing trend toward politicization
and informalization of the legal order, Article
25 of the 1975 Constitution calls for the subjec-
tion of the people's courts to the control of
local political leadership (the revolutionary
committees) at corresponding levels and the
application of the mass line as the operational
principle for procuratorial and trial work.48 It
further legitimizes the dominant position of
the police in law enforcement by providing
that "the functions and powers of procuratorial
organs are exercised by the organs of public
security at various levels."
Despite the apparent recision of many provi-
sions of the 1954 Organic Law of the People's
Courts by the current Constitution, the four-
level court structure and the two-trial system
continue to function. 49 The role of the courts,
nevertheless, is quite modest. A great many
cases of anti-social behavior are handled by
public security organs. An even greater num-
ber of conflicts are resolved by basic-level ad-
ministrative units and mass organizations. The
courts appear to be involved only in serious
criminal cases and divorce litigations.
As the extrajudicial process of law enforce-
ment and dispute resolution now receives more
emphasis than before the Cultural Revolution,
it is important to identify the major participants
in the process. The basic level of government
48 The first paragraph of Article 25 states "The
people's courts are responsible and accountable to
the people's congress and their permanent organs at
the corresponding levels. The Presidents of the peo-
ple's courts are appointed and subject to removal by
the permanent organs of the people's congress at the
corresponding levels." According to Article 22, the
permanent organs of the people's congresses at local
levels are the local revolutionary committees which
serve as the local government. The control of the
Party over the state apparatus and the PLA are
explicitly stated in Articles 2, 15, 16 and 117 of the
Constitution. For a discussion of the supremacy of
the CCP, see Chang, A Comparative Study of the 1954
and 1975 State Constitutions of Communist China, in
Lindsay, supra note 27, at 52-54; TAO-TAI HSIA & K.
HAUN, supra note 42, at 36-39.
49 The four levels are the Supreme People's Court,
high courts, intermediate courts and basic courts.
Under the two-trial system a judgment of the court
of first instance can be appealed once to the court of
the next higher level. The continuing operation of
this system is confirmed by Chinese Spokesmen. See
Chinese Aide Gives Description of Public Execution, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 13, 1975, at 8 col. 2; Ruge, An Interview
with Chinese Legal Officials, 1975 CHINA Q. 119-20
(No. 61).
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is the street revolutionary committee in an
urban area and the commune revolutionary
committee in the countryside. Below the street
revolutionary committee are quasi-official resi-
dents committees, which are in turn subdivided
into residents groups; below the commune rev-
olutionary committee are quasi-official produc-
tion brigade committees, which are in turn
subdivided into production team committees.50
Parallel to the administrative structure, both
the Communist Party and the public security
apparatus are organized in hierarchies extend-
ing down to the lowest level. In addition, secu-
rity protection committees, mediating commit-
tees, the Young Communist League, the
Women's Association, and other activist net-
works are formed in residential, production
and occupational units.51
Under the overall direction of the Party,
these official, quasi-official, and mass organi-
s0 Except for the substitution of the revolutionary
committee as the local government (Article 22 of the
Constitution), the basic-level administrative structure
is essentially the same as that before the Cultural
Revolution. See Regulations Governing the Organization
of Street Administrative Offices and City Residents Commit-
tees, 1 CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KUO-HO-KUO FA-KUEI
HUI-PIEU (Collection of Laws and Regulations of the
People's Republic of China) 171-75 (1955) [hereinaf-
ter cited as F.K.H.P.]; A. BARNETT, supra note 22, at
339-62; Cohen, Chinese Law: At the Crossroads, 59
A.B.A. J. 42-44 (1973); Crook, The Commune System
in the People's Republic of China, 1963-74, in CHINA: A
REASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMY 366-410 (1975).
5" For charts outlining the interrelationship of
these organizations and Party and state apparatuses
before the Cultural Revolution, see J. COHEN, supra
note 6, at 140-41 and Lubman, supra note 8, at 1313,
1331. Whatever disruptions occurred during the Cul-
tural Revolution, these activist networks are now
back in operation with greater vigor. For instance,
the mediation committees are reported to have been
active in settling civil disputes, with a network set up
at the production brigade level in the countryside
and the street committee level in urban areas. Stew-
art, Divorces in China Decided by Peers, N.Y. Times
Nov. 11, 1973, at 5, col. 1. The security protection
committees, originally organized in 1952 as exten-
sions of the police, have also been revitalized since
the Cultural Revolution. A 1972 document of the
Public Security Ministry provides for the establish-
ment of the security protection committees, com-
posed of three to eleven members each, in produc-
tion brigades or teams, street committees, factories,
mines, enterprises, and schools. The main tasks of
these committees are to assist public security organs
"first to conduct among the masses propaganda-edu-
cation to heighten their revolutionary consciousness,
and to teach them in the observance of state policies
and laws" and "secondly to organize the masses to
guard against counterrevolutionaries, enemy special
zations are the primary extra-judicial institu-
tions settling civil disputes and disposing of
minor criminal cases. When conflict arises, the
informal resolution process is conducted by
cadres and activists in those basic-level units
along with friends, relatives, neighbors, and
co-workers of the parties involved. From the
outset, it must be determined whether any
given situation involves "antagonistic" or "non-
antagonistic" contradicitons, as prescribed by
Mao. 52 For instance, mediation and persuasion
are employed by individuals or a small group
to resolve disputes between neighbors or
spouses. Struggle, criticism, and self-criticism
before a group are used to deal with minor
cases of misbehavior, such as gambling and
petty theft. For more serious wrongdoings or
repeat offenders, "administrative" sanctions,
including detention and supervised or compul-
sory labor, are imposed by public security or-
gans.5
The activities of extra-judicial units at the
"grass roots" level take care of most of the civil
disputes and minor criminal offenses. Only
after the "exhaustion of local remedies" are a
few civil disputes, usually divorce cases, re-
ferred to the courts, where mediation efforts
are again undertaken, before there will be an
agents, fire, and natural disasters." Articles 2 and 18
of Chin-an pao-wei wei-yuan hui kung-tso hsi-tse (shih-
hsing tsao-an) [Detailed Works for the Security Pro-
tection Committee (experimental draft)], issued on
November 25, 1972 by the Public Security Ministry of
the PRC. The document is on file at the Institute of
Mainland China Affairs, Taipei, Taiwan.
52 In a speech given early in 1957, On the Correct
Handling of Contradictions Among the People, Mao dif-
ferentiates between "contradictions between our-
selves and the enemy" and "contradictions among
the people." English text of his speech can be found
in Supplement to People's China 3-27 (No. 13, 1957).
The implications of this particular speech will be
analyzed later in this article.
53 The description of the informal process of law
enforcement and dispute resolution is based on
emigr6 accounts and reports of visitors. For the
latter, see Cohen, supra note 50, at 43; Crockett,
Criminal Justice in China, 59 JUDICATURE 239 (1975).
According to information from former cadres, the
public security organs can impose three types of
"labor sanctions": "supervised labor" in the old place
of work with no fixed period, "compulsory labor" in
a farm for two or three years, and "rehabilitation
through labor" in a designated camp for four to six
years. Compare this with the discussions in J. COHEN,
supra note 6, at 20-21 and in Ch'iu K'ung-yuan,
Social Disorders under the Maoist Hierarchy, 12 IssuES &
STUDIES 14-15 (No. 5, 1976).
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adjudication.54 Serious crimes, i.e., rape, rob-
bery, corruption, embezzlement, and "counter-
revolutionary activities" are also brought to the
courts for disposition.
As provided in Article 25 of the Constitution,
the courts follow Mao's mass line in approach-
ingjudicial work. One method for implement-
ing this approach is to bring the courts to the
people by holding trials in a factory, store, or
commune.
55 Another is for judicial workers to
go to the masses to make the investigation and
to seek out the views of the people. Still another
is to disseminate materials on cases of political
or educational value among the public for
consideration in small group discussions. Opin-
ions and suggestions resulting from such dis-
cussions are supposed to be consulted by the
courts in reaching final judgments. 56 Finally,
mass trials may be held for cases of special
political significance, particularly those involv-
ing class enemies and counterrevolutionaries.
5 7
54 Visitors' reports and emigre accounts all confirm
this practice. See, e.g., Pestana, Law in the People's
Republic of China, 1 OCCASIONAL REPORT-AsIAN
STUDIES, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 2 (1975); Lub-
man, A Divorce Trial-Peking Style, Wall St. J., June
5, 1973, at 22, col. 4. According to an informant,
most of the civil disputes handled by the intermediate
court of Ichang in Hupei have been divorce cases,
sometimes as high as two hundred a month.
55 Pestana, supra note 54 at 2-3; Lamb, An Interview
with Chinese Legal Officials, 1976 CHINA Q. 324 (No. 66).
" Ruge, supra note 49, at 121-22. Interviews with
former cadres and residents in China indicate that in
important cases of a political nature the public is
usually given brief, conclusory materials refering to
the offenses as "viciously attacking socialism," "arous-
ing the great anger of the masses," etc. As a rule, the
people follow the guidance of these documents and
party leaders in making suggestions about punish-
ment at small group discussions. In less important
cases, however, there appears to be more leeway for
the people to express their views. One informant
said that he was once saved from imprisonment for
an alleged attempt to escape to Hong Kong by the
strong defense of his innocence received from his
co-workers in an organization. A recent report by
foreign travellers in Sian described an unusual poster
campaign conducted by "the masses" concerning an
alleged case of rape. Apparently with official ap-
proval, the posters protested to the Provincial Revo-
lutionary Committee of Shensi, the unjust condem-
nation of a young worker, named Wang, to twenty
years imprisonment for the "rape." Among other
complaints, the posters said that the judicial authori-
ties never consulted "the masses," specifically the
workers at Wang's factory. China's 'Masses' Hit Author-
ities Over Rape Case, The Washington Post, Aug. 16,
1976, at A8, col. 2.
57 There were frequent reports on mass trials and
Throughout the judicial process, the courts
work closely with the public security apparatus.58
All important decisions, of course, have to be
cleared with the revolutionary committees and
Party committees of corresponding levels.5 9
However, the judiciary does provide these de-
cisions with a stamp of legitimacy and continues
to play a limited but useful role in the PRC's
entire law enforcement framework.
CLAss NATURE OF PEOPLE'S JUSTICE
The class nature of law is an essential com-
ponent of Communist jurisprudence, as evi-
denced by statements of Marx, Lenin and oth-
ers.60 In the PRC, Mao Tse-tung also ex-
pounded the concept of class justice by saying,
"Such state apparatus as the army, the police
and the courts are instruments with which one
class oppresses another. As far as the hostile
classes are concerned these are instruments of
judgment-pronouncing rallies during and shortly
after the Cultural Revolution. For more recent re-
ports on the practice of mass trials, see The Provincial
Scence in China, China News Summary, May 12, 1976
(No. 613)(Hong Kong), at 1.
58 According to one source, members of the court
and of the public security bureau work together in a
legal subcommittee appointed by the revolutionary
committeee. Cheng Huan, Law in China, 4 FAR EAST-
ERN ECON. REV. 14 (1972). More often, it appears
that judicial and police personnel coordinate their
work informally through close contacts. Visitors and
emigres have seen the signs of the court and the
public security organ hung in the same building.
'9 American visiting lawyers were surprised to
learn of this. See Crockett, supra note 53, at 245. In
posters reportedly appearing in Canton at the end of
1974, demobilized veterans of Kwangtung urged the
Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial
Higher People's Court to handle promptly the com-
plaint against the illegal beating of some veterans by
personnel of public security and workers provost
corps on November 24, 1974. According to the pos-
ters, when representativei of the veterans went to
the Higher Court to inquire about the lack of re-
sponse to their written complaint, they were told
that the complaint had been sent up to the Provincial
Party Committee for disposition since the court could
not independently handle the case without the writ-
ten guidance of the Party Committee. MING PAO
MONTHLY 98-99 (No. 112, 1975).
60 According to Marx and Engels, legal institutions
are parts of the superstructure on an economic base;
they are tools of class rule, designed to promote the
interest of the ruling class. Lenin and A.Y. Vishinsky
also emphasized the class nature of law in suppressing
the counterrevolutionaries. J. HAGARD, COMMUNISTS
AND THEIR LAW 69-70 (1969); H. KELSEN, THE COM-
MUNIST THEORY OF LAW 1, 31, 51, 128 (1955); LENG,
supra note 6, at xi-xii.
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oppression. They are violent and certainly not
'benevolent things."'61 In the words of a
Chinese jurist, the socialist law in China is "a
sharp weapon for carrying out class struggle in
the hands of the broad masses of laboring
people led by the proletariat," used primarily
to suppress the enemy, protect the revolution-
ary order, and insure the success of socialism.62
Using the class line approach, Mao provided
a theoretical framework for differentiating and
resolving social conflicts with his famous 1957
speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradic-
tions Among the People." In the speech, he
drew a basic distinction between two types of
contradictions: "Contradictions between our-
selves and the enemy" (antagonistic contradic-
tions) and "contradictions among the people"
(non-antagonistic contradictions). Mao defined
in broad terms "the people" as "the classes,
strata, and social groups which approve, sup-
port and work for the cause of socialist con-
struction" and "the enemy" as "the social forces
and groups which resist the socialist revolution,
and are hostile and try to wreck socialist con-
struction."63
As the two contradictions are fundamentally
different, the methods for solving them also
differ. According to Mao, conflicts among the
people are to be dealt with by the "method of
democracy" and conflicts with the enemy by
the "method of dictatorship." In settling "ques-
tions between right and wrong among the peo-
ple," reliance should be placed on education
and persuasion. In dealing with "reactionaries,
exploiters, counterrevolutionaries, landlords,
bureaucrats, capitalists, robbers, swindlers,
murderers, arsonists, hooligans, and other
scoundrels who seriously disrupt social order,"
measures of dictatorship and severe sanctions
must be employed.64
61 MAO TSE-TUNG, ON PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIc DIc-
TATORSHIP 17 (1951).
62 Chou Hsiu-min, Law is a Sharp Weapon of Class
Struggle, J.M.J.P., Oct. 28, 1964, at 2.
63 Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contra-
dictions among the People, supra, note 52, at 4. For
Mao's earlier writings on related subjects, see Analysis
of the Classes in Chinese Society, March 1926 and On
Contradictions, I SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG
13-19,311-16 (1967).
64 Mao, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions,
supra, note 52, at 4-6. This is essentially consistent
with his earlier thesis about "democracy for the
people and dictatorship for the reactionaries." In an
important essay written in 1949, Mao advocated a
Mao's theoretical formulation on contradic-
tions has since become a most frequently cited
guideline for law enforcement in China and is
incorporated into the preamble of the 1975
Constitution. In order to correctly distinguish
antagonistic from non-antagonistic contradic-
tions, it is imperative for judicial and public
security personnel to use a class stand point to
determine the nature of a problem. 6 From a
class viewpoint, the so-called "five black ele-
ments" (landlords, rich peasants, counterrevo-
lutionaries, rightists, and other bad elements)
are considered "the enemy.
66
All persons labelled as "five black elements"
are treated as political outcasts and potential
criminals. "They are held up," says one ob-
server, "as 'negative examples' and as living
symbols of what happens to enemies of the
regime. '67 When crimes are committed, such
persons usually recieve harsher sanctions for
the same offense than those among "the peo-
ple."6 This is particularly true during a politi-
policy of benevolence and persuasion toward the
people but a violent and oppressive policy toward
the reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries. MAO
TSE-TUNG, ON PEOPLE's DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP,
supra note 61, at 16-18.
' Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Court by
its President Hsieh Chueh-tsai, N.C.N.A., Dec. 26, 1964;
Ho Chin-Ching and Wu Chien-fan, How to Distinguish
Strictly the Two Types of Contradictions and the Two
Different Methods of Dealing with Them in Political and
Legal Work, C.F.Y.C. 28 (No. 2, 1963).
61 According to Mao Tse-tung, the term "the peo-
ple" has different meanings in different countries
and in different historical periods in each country.
In 1957 "the people" he referred to included the
workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and national
bourgeoisie. Mao, On the Correct Handling of Contradic-
tions, supra note 52, at 3-4. However, the bourgeoisie
has since been dropped from "the people." The 1975
constitution only mentions the workers, peasants,
and non-agricultural individual laborers in the
Chinese body politic (Articles 1 and 5). Article 14 of
the Constitution also deprives the political rights of
the following enemy groups: "the landlords, rich
peasants, reactionary capitalists, and other bad ele-
ments."
7 A. BARNETT,SUpra note 22, at 404.
6 In a violent dispute involving forty-odd men in
the outskirts of Canton in late 1955, the public
security cadres singled out one man who had a
"counterrevolutionary" history for prosecution. He
was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to five years
of reform through labor. J. COHEN, supra note 6, at
511-12. Similar cases of this nature have been re-
ported by recent emigr6s. In one adultery case occur-
ring in Amoy in 1971, the man was a factory worker
and the woman's father was a former KMT official.
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cal campaign when members of the "black
elements" often provide convenient targets for
class hostility and abuse.69 On the other hand,
persons of good class background are reported
to have received lenient treatment even in
serious cases such as rape.70
The strong class character of Chinese crimi-
nal law is clearly stated in an official textbook.
"The criminal law of our country primarily
deals blows to the counterrevolutionaries, to
the criminals of homicide, arson, burglary,
fraud, rape, and other offenses seriously ob-
structing social order and socialist construction.
It must be understood that the point of our
criminal law is chiefly directed toward the ene-
mies of socialism."'" Consequently, when case
materials are disseminated among the public
for discussion, they outline, among other
things, the nature and gravity of the offense,
Because of different class backgrounds, he was sen-
tenced to one year of imprisonment while she re-
ceived a two-year prison term.
69 It is during political campaigns that many per-
sons are either classified for the first time or "capped"
again as members of the "five black elements." It is
also in political campaigns that harsh sanctions
against class enemies are used and publicized to serve
the purpose of "killing chickens to scare monkeys."
The Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Move-
ment of the 1960's and the Cultural Revolution of
the 1960's were marked with mass trials and revolu-
tionary excesses. Even in the milder Anti-Lin Piao
and Anti-Confucius Campaign of the early 1970's,
there were occassional reports of public executions
connected with this drive. See, e.g., 30 Reported Exe-
cuted in China; Deaths Linked to Anti-Confucius Drive,
The Baltimore Sun, April 18, 1974, at A6.
70 Two cases based on interviews may be cited
here as illustrations. In a 1958 case that occurred in a
village near Canton, a militiaman unsuccessfully at-
tempted to rape a landlord's daughter and beat the
father up rather badly. The public security station
chief did not want to punish a "good person" such as
the militiaman for misconduct toward a "bad person"
such as a landlord. Consequently, the militiaman was
sent to rehabilitation through labor instead of being
sentenced to five to seven years in prison. J. COHEN,
supra note 6, at 266-67. In a 1961 case occurring in
Enp'ing County, Kwangtung, a militiaman raped a
former landlord's wife at gun point and claimed that
she had seduced him. Even after the true facts were
established, the case was categorized as a "contradic-
tion within the people" and no serious punishment
was meted out to the wrongdoer. Shinichino, A
Report of the Production Team: A Personal Interview, 11
IssuEs AND STUDIES 88-89 (No. 3, 1975).
71 CENTRAL POLITICAL-JUDICIAL CADRES' SCHOOL,
LECTURES ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1957),
translated inJ.P.R.S. 18 (No. 1331, 1962).
the social origin of the offender, his personal
background, class stand, and political attitude
and motivation. Members of small discussion
groups invariably follow the tone of the distrib-
uted documents and use the class line as the
criterion to suggest punishment. If in doubt,
they always find it prudent to take the position
of the left rather than the right.
72
Political considerations are not only applied
to the sanctioning process in the PRC. Even in
dealing with a civil dispute, a firm class view-
point is also required.73 The concept of equality
before the law for all persons certainly has no
place in people's justice. Those few Chinese
leaders in favor of such a bourgeois concept
have been severely attacked by the Maoists.
Class and class struggle is a great revolutionary
magic weapon of Marxism-Leninism and the
thought of Mao Tse-tung ... However, the
handful of top capitalist roaders within the Party
vainly attempted to wipe out fundamentally the
dictatorship of the proletariat by means of law..
Counterrevolutionary revisionist P'eng Chen
even openly jumped forth to set the tune saying:
"All citizens of ours can become equal and must
be equal before the law." He advocated "equal
treatment" and stated that "there is no need to
adopt a class viewpoint in addition to law." He
rejected the class character of law, thus over-
throwing the proletarian dictatorship. In this
way, the public security organs, procuratorates,
law courts and armed forces became ordinary
organs instead of instruments of the dictator-
ship. The question of who should be defended
or suppressed was obliterated at one stroke,
and with no dividing line drawn between the
enemy and ourselves, how could revolution be
carried out? If such peaceful evolution were
permitted to go on, our proletarian regime
would not take long to end in capitalist restora-
tion.74
72 Information supplied by recent emigres. Their
description of standards and contents of distributed
case materials is the format confirmed by a Chinese
document in the author's possession, Strengthen War
Preparation, Strengthen Struggle Against the Enemy, and
Strengthen the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, issued by
the People's Security Group of the Yunnan Provincial
Revolutionary Committee, on January 21, 1970 (13
pages).
73 LENG, supra note 6, at 174. For a discussion of
politicization of dispute resolution, see Lubman, su-
pra note 8. at 1339-46.
74 Completely Smash the Feudal, Capitalist and Revi-
sionist Legal System, supra note 2, at 23-24. Until his
ouster during the Cultural Revolution, P'eng Chen
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It should be noted, however, that the class
line is not a rigid but a flexible tool of the
Party. According to Mao Tse-tung, a person's
class status is not only determined by his social
origin and class background but, more impor-
tantly, by his political attitudes and behavior.7
5
Consequently, a serious deviant act can cause
the change of an individual's label from a
member of the people to the category of the
enemy. By the same token, it is at least techni-
cally feasible for a member of the "five (black)
elements" to be elevated to the category of the
people through evidence of good conduct and
ideological transformation.
In fact, the Communist authorities in China
have occasionally taken a relatively "soft" stand
toward the political outcasts and their relatives
by giving them some hope of changing their
class status. This tactic is in line with Mao's
teaching of "winning over the majority and
opposing the minority. ' 76 At times, law en-
forcement cadres have publicized the following
policy line:
Class background is a very important criterion
but not the sole determinant for treatment;
emphasis must be placed on political perform-
ance. Members of the "five (black) elements"
are told to reform themselves and establish
merits so they can be "uncapped" and have
their class status changed.77
Special appeal is often directed to the chil-
dren of the "five (black) elements," who are
urged to draw a sharp demarcation between
themselves and their reactionary families and
to come to the side of the revolution. 8 Some
was the mayor of Peking and a close associate of Liu
Shao-ch'i.
" For a discussion of the question of class in Mao
Tse-tung's thought, see B. SCHWARTZ, COMMUNISM
AND CHINA: IDEOLOGY IN FLUX (1968) and Starr,
Conceptual Foundations of Mao Tse-tung's Theory of
Continuous Revolution, 11 ASIAN SURVEY 620 (1971).
76 This is an often-quoted Maoist dictum to isolate
and annihilate the enemy. Mao stated in 1962 and
again in 1967 that the "five bad elements" only
constituted five percent of the Chinese population.
MAO TSE-TUNG SSU-HSIANG WAN-SIU (Long live Mao
Tse-tung's Thought) 419, 666 (1969).
" Emigr6 accounts of the policy pursued in early
1973 by the public security organ of Ch'aoyang,
Kwangtung; PEOPLE'S SECURITY GROUP OF THE YU-
NAN PROVINCIAL REVOLUTIONARY COMM., PAO-WEI
KUNG-TSO CHING-YEN (Experience from security
work) 1-13 (1970).
78 Id., at 3-4, 13-15; also emigr6 reports of the
policy adopted by the Canton authorities in 1973.
of them have even been absorbed into the
ranks of cadres to serve as "positive samples".7 9
LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
SOCIAL ENGINEERING
Two concepts have conditioned the Chinese
perception of the role of law in their revolu-
tionary scheme. One is the Marxist-Lenist the-
ory that considers law as a political tool to
implement Party policy.80 The other is Mao's
idea of "uninterrupted revolution" that called
for a continuous effort to mold and remold
human nature. 1 These two conceptions have
combined to provide the Chinese elites with a
theoretical framework to view law as an instru-
ment of social engineering, to be used for the
transformation of Chinese society and its mem-
bers in accordance with the revolutionary ide-
ology. Either in a formal or informal style, law
is seen as an important agent of political social-
ization and mobilization to inculcate the people
with the new socialist morality. Consequently,
there has been much stress in the PRC on the
educational functions of the courts, popular
participation in rule enforcement, reformative
aspects of penal policy, and flexibility rather
than rigidity in the application of law.
Despite the Chinese emphasis on the infor-
mality of law, a large body of substantive laws
and regulations have been promulgated by the
PRC.82 Many of them have been concerned
with the implementation of the Communist
elites' policy of systemic transformation. For
instance, the Land Reform Law and the Mar-
riage Law were enacted in 1950 to change
fundamentally China's land and family sys-
11 As reported by several former cadres.
80 Lenin said: "Law is a political instrument. It is
politics." J. HAZARD, supra note 60, at 69.
81 For relevant discussion of Mao's theory of con-
tinuous (uninterrupted) revolution and his belief in
the malleability of human nature, see Schram, Mao
Tse-tung and the Theory of Permanent Revolution, 1958-
1969, 1971 CHINA Q. 221 (No. 46); Munro, The
Malleability of Man in Chinese Marxism, 1971 CHINA Q.
609 (No. 48).
82 According to an editorial in the People's Daily,
4,072 laws and regulations were passed during the
first eight years of the PRC. J.MJ.P. Oct. 9, 1957, at
1. There are altogether 1,670 documents contained
in the two basic statutory collections published by the
PRC: CHUNG-YANG JEN-MIN CHENG-FU FA-LING HUI-
PIEN (Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Central
People's Government, 1952-55) (5 vols.) [hereinafter
cited as F.L.H.P.] and F.K.H.P.,supra note 50 (1956-
64) (13 vols.).
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tems and to release the social energy of the
people. 83 A host of regulations and measures
were also adopted during the 1950's for eco-
nomic modernization and industrialization, na-
tionalization of enterprises, and collectivization
of agriculture. 4 In the meantime, a number of
other acts were issued to suppress counterre-
volutionaries and to punish corruption and
other anti-social activities.8 5 During 1966-67,
various resolutions and directives were adopted
to carry out Mao's Cultural Revolution, with
one principal aim being the socialization of the
thought and behavior of the people .
86
Many of these laws, regulations, and deci-
sions have been implemented and publicized
by nation-wide campaigns and movements, de-
signed to arouse mass enthusiasm and eliminate
opposition.' It is during such campaigns that
mass trials and public judgment meetings have
been used to dispense people's justice, which
perform not only a deterrent function but a
propaganda-education function of heightening
the people's political awareness.8 8 For instance,
in two mass trials held in Shansi Province in
1970 involving 50,000 people, it was reported
that the broad masses of the revolutionary
people had learned a valuable lesson and vowed
" Text of the Marriage Law in I F.L.H.P. 32-36;
Agrarian Reform Law in id., at 43-49. For a compre-
hensive analysis of the Marriage Law, see M. MEIJER,
MARRIAGE LAW AND POLICY IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC (1971).
84 Relevant laws and regulations can be found in
the two statutory collections cited at supra, note 82.
See also a special collection: SZU-YING EUNG-SHENG-
YEH TI SHE-HUI CHU-I KAI-TSAO CHENG-TSE FA-LING
HSUAN-PIEN (Selections of policies, laws, and regula-
tions concerning the socialist transformation of pri-
vately-owned industry and commerce) (1957).
8 E.g., the Act for Punishment of Counterrevolu-
tionaries (1951), the Provisional Act for Punishment
of Crimes That Endanger State Currency (1951), the
Act for Punishment of Corruption (1952), and the
Security Administration Punishment Act (1957).
86 A useful collection of official documents on the
Cultural Revolution is UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
CCP DOCUMENTS OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CUL-
TURAL REVOLUTION, 1966-1967 (1968).
87 Notably, the Agrarian Reform, Marriage Re-
form, and Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries
campaigns as well as the Great Leap Forward and
the Cultural Revolution. For a discussion of the
PRC's use of campaign techniques, see Yu, Cam-
paigns, Communications and Development in Communist
China in COMMUNICATION AND CHANGE IN THE DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 195-215 (D. Lerner and W.
Schram eds. 1967).
88 LENG, supra note 6, at 35-39; Tao, supra note 6,
at 715-20.
to follow Chairman Mao's instruction to protect
the great achievements of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, to strike against a handful of counter-
revolutionary and other criminal elements, and
to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat. 9 The educational function of the judiciary
is also realized through such mass line devices
as bringing the courts to the people and distrib-
uting case materials for small group discus-
sions. According to one witness, following a
trial held at a factory concerning the stealing
of goods by a worker, the two hundred co-
workers present said that "they had been edu-
cated regarding the struggle against their cor-
ruption by bourgeois ideas, and raised their
understanding of the two lines and revision-
ism."8 0 Likewise, in handling civil disputes,
mostly divorce cases, the courts conduct prop-
aganda and education among both the parties
involved and the public at large. The overrid-
ing objectives are to settle internal contradic-
tions by mediation, to uphold law and disci-
pline, to strengthen the unity of the people,
and to promote the development of socialist
virtues.9l
Educational functions are generally per-
formed by the societal model of law and by the
entire political-legal socialization process. Dis-
cussed above was popular participation in the
extra-judicial activities of law enforcement and
dispute resolution at the "grass roots" level. In
addition, it should be noted that laws, policies,
and other norms are usually communicated to
and internalized by the people through the
media, schools, and study sessions of small
groups organized on the basis of residence or
work.92 Subjects of study sessions vary from
89 Shansi People's Broadcasting Station, Feb. 17,
1970.
90 Lamb, supra note 55, at 325.
" Report of Hsieh Chueh-tsai (outgoing President of
the Supreme People's Court in 1964), J.MJ.P. Jan.
1, 1965, at 1. A Chinese official has recently pointed
out that divorce is not granted lightly and that
disputes are generally resolved in a manner that
takes more account of the welfare of the state rather
than that of the individual, who is expected to place
his social responsibilities before personal considera-
tons. Stewart, Divorces in China Decided by Peers, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 11, 1973, at 5, col. 1. This observation
has been confirmed by a number of emigr6s. The
political nature of the PRC's divorce policy is exam-
ined by Meijer, supra note 82, at 211-25.
92 For a.general discussion of the socialization
process, seeA. LIU, COMMUNICATIONS AND NATIONAL
INTEGRATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1971); R. PRICE,
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week to week in accordance with existing polit-
ical situations. They may be Mao's speeches or
People's Daily's editorials. Cadres who serve as
group leaders are often guided by internal
directives that focus on specific issues of a
given moment, [e.g., Compiled Material of the
Mass Rallies for Protecting the Railway Security
and for Criticizing, Struggling Against and Dispos-
ing of the Criminal Elements (issued by the Bureau
of Public Security of Yunnan Province, the
Higher People's Court of Yunnan Province,
and the Revolutionary Committee of Kunming
Railway Bureau, April, 1975), 9" Study Material
for Public Security Work (Supplement) (issued by
the Bureau of Public Security of Yunnan Prov-
ince, Feb., 1974) ,9 and Detailed Regulations for
Work of the Security Protection Committee (issued
by the Public Security Ministry, Nov., 1972). 95]
Statutes are interpreted to the public by cadres
according to the policy demands of the day.
The Marriage Law of 1950, for instance, re-
mains effective today and is frequently cited in
divorce judgments. 9 Yet its provision on the
marriageable age (20 years of age for the man
and 18 for the woman) has been modified by
the Party policy favoring late marriage. Article
4 of the Marriage Law notwithstanding, mar-
riage is now generally discouraged for men
below thirty and for women below twenty-five
years of age .9
EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1970); C. RIDLEY,
P. GODWIN AND D. DEOLIN, THE MAKING OF A MODEL
CITIZEN IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1971); F.T.C. Yu,
MASS PERSUASION IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1964).
93 Chinese text and its English translation are in 11
ISSUES AND STUDIES 77-84 (No. 3, 1975).
" A copy of the document is in the author's posses-
sion.
9 See note 51 supra.
96 In a judgment rendered on March 22, 1973 [Fa-
tzu (73) No. 1], the People's Court of Swatow, Kwang-
tung, stated that it had followed the spirit of Articles
8, 17 and 20 of the Marriage Law to decide on the
granting of divorce, property arrangements and cus-
tody of the children. In another divorce judgment
rendered on May 23, 1974 [Min-tzu (74) No. 211, the
People's Court of Paoan, Kwangtung, also cited the
provision of Article 17 of the Marriage Law to sup-
port its decision. Copies of both judgments are in
the possession of the author.
17 Meijer, supra note 82, at 80; New Trend for Late
Marriage, J.MJ.P. June 12, 1973, at 3; Why Have We
Delayed Our Marriage?, Ta-kung pao (The Impartial),
March 9, 1973, at 8. Reports from informants indi-
cate, however, that the late marriage policy has been
enforced less vigorously in the rural areas than in
the cities.
The concept of law as an instrument of
education and ideological indoctrination is also
manifested in the emphasis placed on thought
reform by PRC penal measures. Peking's policy
of combining leniency with punishment and
reform through labor with education has its
origin in the years of Kiangsi and Yenan. 9s Its
theoretical basis again has been provided by
the writings of Mao Tse-tung. In a 1934 report
to the Second Soviet Congress, Mao stressed
the educational functions of the labor reform
institutions in the Kiangsi Soviet. 99 Writing On
People's Democratic Dictatorship in 1949, he prom-
ised that members of reactionary classes who
gave up counterrevolutionary activities would
be granted the opportunity to work and to
reform themselves through labor so as to be-
come new men.100 In a report on "the ten
major relationships" in 1956, he emphasized
the reform through labor rather than execution
of counterrevolutionaries, in order to convert
"worthless things into useful ones" and to avoid
making "irretrievable mistakes."101 Discussing
how to deal with the enemy in his 1957 speech
on contradictions, Mao suggested that the
method of dictatorship be used to compel them
to obey the law of the people's government
and to engage in labor and, through labor,
transform themselves into new men.
10 2
There is a hierarchy of sanctions in the PRC
that puts offenders through the reform proc-
ess. For lesser offenses, individuals may be
placed under "control" or sentenced to per-
forming "supervised labor" at the place of
residence or work. For more serious crimes,
offenders may be sent to camps to undergo
rehabilitation through labor or reform through
labor. The last two sanctions are governed by
the following two major statutes: 1954 Act for
Reform Through Labor and 1957 Decision of
the State Council on Education and Rehabilita-
tion Through Labor.
1 0 3
98 LENG, supra note 6, at 9, 13; P. GRIFFIN, supra
note 11, at 128-29.
9 V. YAKKONTOFF, THE CHINESE SovIETs 262
(1934).
100 MAO TSE-TUNG, supra note 61, at 18.
101 He also said that his policy would be beneficial
to both China's domestic affairs and international
influence. MAO TSE-TUNG SSU-HSIANG WAN-SUI, Su-
pra note 76, at 75.
102 Mao, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions,
supra note 52, at 8.
103 Text of the Act is in 5 F.L.H.P. 34-44 and text
of the Decision is in 6 F.K.H.P. 243-44. Rehabilitation
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The principal aim of the corrective measures,
according to Chinese spokesmen, is reeduca-
tion rather than punishment. Physical labor is
an important part of the reform process, be-
cause it eliminates the criminal's reactionary
ideology of the exploiting class and enables
him to learn productive skills to meet the needs
of the society. 10 4 Devices for ideological reform
include self-criticism and criticism in group
meetings, preparation of lengthy written
confessions, and exposure and denunciation of
others' wrongdoings. Political education is also
conducted in study sessions whereby the of-
fenders learn about Marxism-Leninism, the
thought of Mao Tse-tung, state laws, Party
policies, and current affairs.105 In the end,
each individual is evaluated on the basis of his
work performance, sincerity in repentance, dil-
igence in study, and responsiveness to re-
form. 06 A system of rewards and sanctions is
through labor is an "administrative" sanction while
reform through labor (for all imprisonment) is a
"criminal" and harsher sanction. For details as well
as some translated statutes, see COHEN,supra note 6,
chs. IV and XI.
104 Statements by Chinese jurists to recent Western
visitors can be found in Ruge, supra note 49, at 122
and in R. Brown, Law in Present Day China 12-13
(unpublished manuscript, 1975). See also Meng Chao-
Liang, The Basic Situation in Reform Through Labor
Work in the Last Nine Years, C.F.Y.C. 66 (No. 5, 1958).
A recent study by an American scholar indicates that
the primary activity in corrective labor camps is labor
in terms of time. Whyte, Corrective Labor Camps in
China, 13 ASIAN SURVEY 253-69 (1973). Although
beyond the scope of this article, one should not
overlook the economic contribution of the compul-
sory labor systems to the construction of China's
public works and development projects.
105 Meng Chao-liang, supra note 104, at 67-68;
Whyte, supra note 104, at 260-61. See also accounts in
W. ALLYN AND A. RIcxmTT, PRISONERS OF LIBERA-
TION (1957); BAO RUO-WANG(Jean Pasqualini) & R.
CHELMINSKI, PRISONER OF MAO (1973); M. HARBERT,
CAPTIVITY (1973); LAI YING, THE THIRTY-SIXTH WAY
(1969); R. LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF TOTALISM (1961).
106 See, for example, Articles 68 and 69 of the 1954
Act for Reform through Labor. In a document issued
in 1970 by the People's Security Group of the Yunnan
Provincial Revolutionary Committee, the following
criteria were used to evaluate the "five (bad) ele-
ments" under "control": (1) Whether they had used
the thought of Mao Tse-tung to reform their
thought; (2) Whether they had actively participated
in productive labor to reform themselves; (3)
Whether they had faithfully obeyed state laws and
regulations and accepted the supervision of the mass;
and (4) Whether they had been courageous to expose
used to influence, individual behavior. The
guiding principle is always "'leniency to those
who confess (cooperate) and severity to those
who resist.
'10 7
It is difficult to make a conclusive appraisal
of Chinese corrective institutions. On the one
hand, there have been enthusiastic claims of
the humanitarian concern for the successful
transformation of the criminals.10 s On the other
hand, charges of cruelty and exploitation have
been made against the Chinese system of "force
labor."'0 9 One thing, however, seems clear:
under Mao's guidance the PRC has developed
elaborate thought reform techniques applicable
to labor camps as well as society at large in an
effort to transform human nature and to secure
the general acceptance of goals and norms of
the socialist system. 10
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTI-CONFUCIAN AND
PRO-LEGALIST CAMPAIGN
The campaign to denounce Confucianism
and praise Legalism began in 1972, intensified
during 1973-74, and faded away inconclusively
and denounce bad elements and evil deeds. PAo-wEi
KUNG-TSO CHING-YEN,supra note 77, at 12-15.
107 Ruge, supra note 49, at 122. In the notices
issued by the Chinese People's Liberation Army Mili-
tary Control Section of the Public Security Organs of
Meng-lien County in Yunnan Province (Aug. 8,
1972), and by the Intermediate People's Court of
Harbin City of the Heilungkiang Province (Nov. 17,
1973), this principle was cited as grounds for sentenc-
ing the criminals. See Hungdah Chiu, supra note 27
at 110, 114.
"0s The Chinese have often cited the successful
reform of Pu Yi, the last Manchu emperor, as an
example. Pestana, supra note 54, at 4-5; R. Brown,
supra note 104, at 13. In Dec., 1959 the Supreme
People's Court granted amnesty to a group of KMT
"war criminals," who reportedly were moved by the
humanitarianism of the new society and called the
Party and the government as their "reborn parents."
Ku Fang-p'ing, The Great Victory of the Policy of Reform-
ing Criminals, C.F.Y.C. 36-37 (No. 6, 1959). A similar
theme was reported when another group of KMT
"war criminals" was released in 1975. N.C.N.A.
March 19, 1975. See also E. SNOW, THE OTHER SIDE
OF THE RIVER 47-48 (1962).
109 See, e.g., COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL COUTRE
LE RfGIME CONCENTRATIONAIRE, WHITE BOOK ON
FORCED LABOR AND CONCENTRATION CAMPS IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1957-58) (2 vols.); Ko-
wen, The Narration of a 'War Criminal', Shih-chieh jih-
pao (World Journal) (New York), Oct. 1976-Present.
110 For an interesting discussion of the mechanism
of social control in the PRC, see Vogel, Voluntarism
and Social Control, in SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUN-




in early 1975.1 Recent revelations have con-
firmed the view previously held by analysts
that the campaign was not a mere academic
debate but a manifestation of factional and
policy conflicts within the Party leadership. 2
The "radicals" initially launched the anti-Con-
fucian campaign in an implicit yet unmistakable
attack against Chou En-lai and his bureaucratic
associates for their retreat from the Cultural
Revolution and the rehabilitation of many
purged officials, but the "moderates" subse-
quently succeeded in transforming the target
of the campaign by linking anti-Confucianism
with the movement against Lin Piao.
11 3
Throughout the campaign the two groups ma-
nipulated historical figures and events to ad-
vance their respective policy lines. The "mod-
erates" expounded the themes of stability,
unity, institutionalization, and economic devel-
opment, while the "radicals" argued for strug-
gle and reform and argued against "the tide"
and the Confucian-type "retrogression and res-
toration."
"I The "radicals" attacked Teng Hsiao-ping and
his associates for sabotaging the campaign. See, e.g.,
T'ing Liang, Why Did Teng Hsiao-ping Ignore the Strug-
gle between Confucianism and Legalism, Hung-chi (Red
Flag), (No. 10, 1976), at 64-65.
112 Two of the representative analytical articles on
the campaign are Goldman, China's Anti-Confucian
Campaign, 1973-74, 1975 CHINA Q. 435 (No. 63) and
Chang. The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign: Its
Meaning and Purpose, 14 ASIAN SURVEY 871-86 (1974).
For detailed work on the subject, see WANG HSUEH-
WEN. LEGALISM AND ANTI-CONFUCIANISM IN MAOIST
POLITICS (1975).
'3 In the current campaign against the "gang of
four" (Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-
yuan, and Wang Hung-wen), PRC spokesmen ac-
cused the "radical" leaders and their supporters
(those writing in the names of Liang Hsiao, Lo Szu-
ting, etc.) of undermining the campaign through the
following distortions: they claimed the continuation
of the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism
up to the present even within the Party is an open
effort to tamper with the nature and program of the
CCP; they used the criticism of Confucius to direct
attack first on Chou En-lai and later on Hua Kuo-
feng; they flaunted the banner of publicizing Legal-
ism to embellish themselves in an attempt to usurp
Party and state power; they glorified Empress Lu
and Tse-tien for the purpose of making Chiang
Ching China's empress of the 20th century. See Shih
Kao, Criticism of Confucianism and Praise of Legalism
are False; Usurpation of Party and State Power is Real.
Hung-chi 108-12 (No. 1, 1977); Hsu Hsun, Chiang
Ching and Empress Lu. 19 PEKING REV. 21-23 (No. 52,
1976); The 'Gang of Four' who make a Mockery of History
Have Been Punished by History, Kuang-ming jih-pao
(Enlightenment Daily) (Peking) Nov. 13, 1976 at 1.
One intriguing aspect of the campaign was
its pro-Legalist position. In order to assess the
possible implications for the role of law in
contemporary China, we shall examine briefly
what areas of Legalism and which Legalist
figures received special attention in the cam-
paign .114
In contrast to the "reactionary" features of
Confucianism, Chinese writers in the campaign
praised Legalism because of its stand for prog-
ress and reform, for law and order, for eco-
nomic and scientific development, and for uni-
fication and centralization.115 Thus, Shang Yang
and Han Fei of the Legalist school were pic-
tured as representing the ideology of the newly
rising landlord class during the Spring and
Autumn Period and the Warring States Period.
Their outlook was innovative and progressive,
and the contention between them and the Con-
fucians, "representative of the declining slave-
owning class," was said to reflect a struggle
between two lines of thought: "whether to
promote the development of the new system,
or to try to preserve the old system; whether to
serve the needs of the newly rising class in
accordance with historical development, or try
to turn history back by following the examples
of 'former sage-kings'; whether to advocate the
rule of 'law' suited to the development of the
new age, or stubbornly try to preserve the so-
called rule of 'rites' in the old system. 1 16 Ac-
cording to this theme, the struggle continued
throughout Chinese history. In the Han dy-
nasty it was between the materialist theory of
knowledge represented by Wang Chung and
the idealist apriorism preached by Tung
Chung-shu.1 1 7 During the Sung dynasty, it was
between the reformists headed by Wang An-
shih and the "diehard big landlord ruling
114 A detailed examination of these issues will be
presented in a paper by the author at the annual
meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in March
1977.
1I In a popular book prepared by the Peking
University, all these points except "law and order"
were mentioned in its concluding observations. Ju-
FA TOU-CHENG SHIH KAI-KUANG (A general survey of
the history of the struggle between Confucianism
and Legalism) 144-45 (1975).
11. Yang Jung-kuo, Struggle between the Two Lines in
the Ideological Sphere during the Spring and Autumn
Period and the Warring States Period, 17 PEKING REV. 5
(No. 8, 1974) and 17 PEKING REV. 14 (No. 9, 1974).
117 Yang Jung-kuo, The Struggle of Materialism
against Idealist Apriorism during the Western and Eastern
Han Dynasties, 1 SELECTED ARTICLES CRITICIZING LIN
PIAO AND CONFUCIUS 143-58 (1975).
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clique" represented by Ssu-ma Kuang and
other Confucianists.1
8
The Legalists' stand for "rule by law" re-
ceived considerable acclaim from PRC authors.
Shang Yang was cited for the statement that
"punishment should be extended to all ranks
of people," a statement interpreted as an actual
criticism of the Confucian view that "punish-
ment should not be extended to anyone in the
rank of ta fu (senior officials) or higher."' 9
When Shang Yang's laws of reform, including
group responsibility for a member's guilt, were
violated, the offenders were severely pun-
ished. 120 As a result, "it is recorded that after
the new laws 'had been enforced for ten years,
the people of Chin were very happy,' 'order
prevailed in town and countryside,' and 'even
women and children talked about Shang Yang's
laws."' A bourgeois revolutionary, Chang Tai-
yen was quoted as saying: "The World sees
only the severity of Shang Yang's new law
without considering its positive conse-
quences.' Han Fei was also praised for
establishing laws and institutions to benefit the
common people, because under the rule by
law "high officials are not exempt from punish-
ment for crimes while the common people are
not denied rewards for good deeds.' 22 His
advocacy of "severe punishment and harsh
laws" was justified on his belief that, "if the law
enforcement officers are firm, the country will
be powerful. If they are weak, the country will
be weak, too.""'
"' Lo Szu-ting, Evolution of the Debate between the
Confucians and Legalists as Seen from Wang An-shih's
Reform, 1 SELECTED ARTICLES CRITICIZING LIN PIAO
AND CONFUCIUS, 185-211; Shih Shang-hui, Wang An-
shih's Legalist Ideas as viewed from the Three "Nots," Ta-
kung pao, Oct., 1973, at 6.
I Yang Jung-kuo, Struggle between Two Lines, PE-
KING REV. (No. 8),supra note 115, at7.
'20 Lo Szu-ting, Struggle between Restoration and
Counter-Restoration in the Course of Founding the Ch'in
Dynasty, 1 SELECTED ARTICLES CRITICIZING LIN PIAO
AND CONFUCIUS 113-15 (1975).
"' Id., at 115. For other PRC writers' views, see
Han-chu, Shang Yang's Reform Measures Constituted a
Profound Social Change, and Liang Hsiao, Comments
on Shang Yang in LUN FA-CHIA mo Ju-FA TOU-CHENG
(comments on the Legalist school and the struggle
between Confucianism and Legalism) 53-71 (1974).
"'. YangJung-kuo, Struggle between Two Lines, supra
note 115; Yang Kuan, The Progressive Function of Han
Fei's Theory of "Rule of Law," LUN FA-CHIA HO Ju-FA
TOU-CHENG 104-05 (1974).
"I Tien Li, Mencius-a Reactionary Thinker Who
Sought to Restore the Slave System, 2 SELECTED ARTICLES
CRITICIZING LIN PIAO AND CONFUCIUS 32 (1975);
The Legalists were also lauded for their
encouragement of economic, scientific, and
technological development. For instance, both
Shang Yang and Han Fei were shown to have
attached great importance to farming and mil-
itary affairs.1 2 4 Hsun Tzu was cited for his idea
of controlling nature. "Instead of obeying t'ien
(Heaven) and praising it, why not control the
rules of t'ien and use them?' ' lu Sang Hung-
yang of the Han dynasty expounded the policy
of state monopoly of salt and iron so as to
"insure the simultaneous growth of agriculture,
handicrafts and trade. 1' 2 6 In general, it was
claimed, the Legalist school's "political line for
progress and change and its materialist view
on nature" helped stimulate the development
of science and technology in old China."2 7
Special emphasis in the campaign was placed
on the concepts of unification and centraliza-
tion advanced by the Legalists. Han Fei, for
instance, was one of those credited with the
development of the theory of "rule by law" on
which to establish a centralized feudal state.
From his examination of historical experience,
Han Fei arrived at the conclusion that only by
strengthening the "rule by law" (appointing
officers according to ability, bestowing titles
according to merits, etc.) could the ruler expect
to build a rich and strong country, consolidate
a centralized political system, and suppress the
"restoration activities" of the slave-owning aris-
tocracy .
28
The fact that the First Emperor of the Ch'in,
aided by Prime Minister Li Ssu, succeeded in
realizing the Legalist goals of unification and
centralization appears to have been a primary
reason for the glorification of Ch'in Shih
Huang in the Anti-Confucian and Pro-Legalist
campaign. Another reason was obviously the
Liang Ling-i, The Consolidator of Pre-Ch'in Legalist
Thoughts-Commenting on Han Fei Tzu, Hung-chi (Red
Flag), (No. 9, 1974), at 29-30.
124 Lo Szu-ting, Struggle between Restoration and
Counter-Reformation, supra note 119, at 113-14; Yang
Jung-kuo, Struggle between Two Lines, PEKING REV.
(No. 8),supra note 115, at 7-8.
" Chu 1-ting, An Outstanding Legalist in the Warring
States Period-Hsun Tzu, LUN FA-CHIA HO Ju-FA TOU-
CHENG 97 (1974).
126 Liang Hsiao, Reflections on the "Discourses on the
State Control of Salt and Iron," 2 SELECTED ARTICLES
CRITICIZING LIN PIAO AND CONFUCIUS 126-27 (1975).
117 See, e.g., Li chung, Struggle between Confucian
and Legalist Schools and Ancient China's Science and
Technology, 17 PEKING REV. 8 (No. 47, 1974).
"2 Yang Kuan,supra note 121, at 103-06.
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attempt to defend Mao Tse-tung and his rule
in response to Lin Piao's denouncing Mao as
the "contemporary Ch'in Shih Haung." In the
"Outline of 571 Project," Lin allegedly attacked
Mao as "the greatest feudal tyrant in Chinese
history who dons Marxist-Leninist clothes but
practices the laws of Ch'in Shih Huang.' 25
One Chinese author in the campaign, for ex-
ample, pointed out that "traitor Lin Piao, like
reactionaries in history, insanely cursed Ch'in
Shih Huang and attacked his laws as a disguise
to attack the proletarian dictatorship and the
revolutionary legal system of socialism."a"°
In the literature published during the cam-
paign Ch'in Shih Huang was presented as a
strong and progressive ruler with several posi-
tive achievements.13' He unified China, by suc-
cessfully conquering the six other states and
building a unitary state. He established central-
ized authority, accomplished through the ab-
rogation of the ducal state institutions, adop-
tion of the prefecture-county system, and crea-
tion of an elaborate bureaucracy centered
around the Emperor. He instituted reforms by
introducing a uniform monetary system, stand-
ardizing weights, measures, vehicles, and the
written language, and constructing postroads
and canals. These were applauded as Ch'in
Shih Huang's significant reform measures de-
signed to promote economic and cultural de-
velopment and consolidate the unification of
the country. Finally, he suppressed the "resto-
ration" movement. The laws of Ch'in were
called an important weapon of the dictatorship
over the slave-owning aristocratic class. Follow-
ing the Legalist doctrine, the First Emperor
129 There are several translations of the "571" doc-
ument. With slight changes, the citation here is based
on that found in REPORT ON MAINLAND CHINA 6
(No. 26, 1972) (China Information Service).
130 Kung Cheng, Comments on the Laws of Ch'in Shih
Huang, LUN FA-CHIA HO Ju-FA TOU-CHENG 119
(1974). It should be noted that until the recent
reversal of their attitude, many PRC writers had
made unfavorable comments on the first Emperor of
Ch'in. Even Mao's attitude had been ambivalent. See
Wang Hsueh-wen, supra note 11, at 153-63 and Li
Yu-ning, supra note 111, at xxvii.
131 See, e.g., HUNG SHIH-TI, CH'IN SHIH HUANG
(First Emperor of Ch'in) (1972); Lo Szu-ting, Struggle
between Restoration and Counter-Restoration, supra note
119, at 124-42; Kung Chen, supra note 129, at 119-
34; Shih Ting, Clarifying "Burning Books and Burying
Confucian Scholars Alive," 17 PEKING REV. 25-28 (No.
19, 1974); Ch'in Shih Huang's Progressive Role in History,
N.C.N.A., June 5, 1974.
advocated the use of laws and decrees as teach-
ing material and officials as teachers. 3 2 His
policy of "burning books and burying Confu-
cian scholars alive" was defended as progressive
and necessary in that it strengthened the cen-
tralized power by striking a severe blow at the
restoration activities of the reactionaries who
"used the past to oppose the present." '
There is little doubt that the campaign to
criticize Confucianism and to praise Legalism
was basically political in nature. Historical fig-
ures and issues were manipulated to support
present leaders and policies. Intentionally or
not, the Legalists' advocacy of "rule by law"
was given a great deal of attention. Despite
official explanations to the contrary, such Le-
galist concepts as "fixed and promulgated laws"
and "equality before the law" appear to be at
variance with the PRC's current practice. 3 4
As a result of the campaign, original works
of the Legalists in complete texts or in excerpts
132 Han Fei once said, "In the state of the intelligent
ruler, there is no literature of books and records,
but the laws serve as teachings. There are no sayings
of the former kings, but the officials act as teachers."
HAN FEi Tzu, ch. 49.
13 It was pointed out that only a small number of
reactionary scholars were killed and that books of a
technical nature were exempted from destruction.
Lo Szu-ting, Struggle between Restoration and Counter-
Restoration, supra note 119, at 135-36 and Shih Ting,
supra note 130, at 26-27. On May 8, 1958. Mao
discussed Ch'in Shih Huang at the Second Plenary
Session of the CCP's Central Committee in the follow-
ing terms:
What was Ch'in Shih Huang anyway? He only
buried four hundred and sixty scholars alive.
We have buried forty-six thousand scholars
alive. In our suppression of counterrevolution-
aries, haven't we killed some reactionary intel-
lectuals? I have argued with Democratic person-
nel: "You accuse us of being Ch'in Shih Huang.
That is not right. We have surpassed Ch'in Shih
Huang hundredfold. You curse us for being
Ch'in Shih Huang, for being dictators. That we
have always admitted. The pity is that you have
not said enough, and we have found it necessary
to make supplements." (roaring laughter)
MAO TSE-TUNG SSU-HSIANG WAN SUI 195 (1969).
134 Some writers tried to reconcile the Legalist
concepts with those of the present regime. One said
that the laws of Ch'in Shih Huang meant not only
the laws and regulations he promulgated but also all
his political, economic, and cultural policies and
decisions. Kung Cheng, supra note 129, at 120. An-
other said, "although the Legalists called their 'Law'
'public justice' and advocated punishment without
regard to classes, their law actually was the manifes-
tation of the class will of the newly-emerging landlord
class." Chu I-ting, supra note 124, at 92.
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have become available to the public. This, along
with the campaign literature, may have a far-
reaching implication in the long run: the devel-
opment of a greater respect for formal laws
and procedures in the PRC.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
From our discussion, we may conclude that
the conventional approach of focusing on for-
mal legal institutions is inadequate for under-
standing the legal system of the PRC. Chinese
law must be examined in terms of both of its
models (formal and informal) and from the
perspective of its broad social functions in the
context of China's revolutionary and develop-
mental experience. What also appears clear is
the strong impact on the Chinese legal devel-
opment made by Mao Tse-tung, especially his
skepticism about bureaucratization, his prefer-
erence for the mass line, and his commitment
to the concept of "uninterrupted revolution."
Mao's influence is reflected in the PRC's em-
phasis on the societal model of law over the
jural model, on flexibility rather than "rigidity"
in the application of law, on the politicization
of the entire legal process, and on the use of
law as an instrument of social engineering to
transform Chinese society as well as its mem-
bers.
Despite Mao's dominant influence, however,
there has been an undercurrent running to-
ward more stable and regularized legal order.
This was expressed by the intellectuals during
the 1957 Hundred Flowers Campaign. In Can-
ton wall posters displayed in late 1974, this
undercurrent was manifested in the demands
on the authorities to observe the law and pro-
tect the people's constitutional rights. 135 Fur-
thermore, some members of the Communist
elites seem to have differed with Mao over the
role of law. Purged leaders such as Liu Shao-
ch'i and P'eng Chen were denounced for their
advocacy of the bourgeois legal system. Even
Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu made occasional
pleas for codification and regularization. In his
15 In a poster appearing at the end of 1974, a
group of demobilized veterans made such demands
on the provincial authorities of Kwangtung. MING
PAO MONTHLY 99 (No. 112, 1975). In another poster
appearing in November, 1974, some educated youths
asked the Fourth National People's Congress to pro-
vide protection for "all the democratic rights which
the masses of people deserve." Concerning the Socialist
Democracy and the Legal System-Dedicated to Chairman
Mao and the Fourth National People's Congress, 12 ISSUES
& STUDIES 142-43 (No. 1, 1976).
reports to the 1973 Tenth Party Congress and
the 1975 Fourth National People's Congress,
Chou En-lai managed to stress the importance
of discipline, economic development, and ra-
tional rules and regulations.1 36 During the
movement against Confucianism, Chou's sup-
porters apparently used the praise of Legalism
to advance the themes of institutionalization
and rule by law.
The passing of Mao from the scene has
created a new situation in China. While the
late Chairman continues to be quoted as a
source of legitimacy, changes in the direction
of Chinese political-legal patterns can be ex-
pected. Already, the "radical" elements are
being purged, and Chou En-lai's plan for mod-
ernization and nationalization is emerging as
state policy. 37 The swing toward institutionali-
zation, specialization, and economic develop-
ment (including foreign trade) is bound to
affect the role of law in the PRC. Given the
unique background and experience of the
Chinese revolution and development, it is quite
likely that many features of people's justice will
remain relatively unchanged in the years to
come. On the other hand, it is likely that in the
future thejural model may achieve some parity
with the societal model of law in China and
that legal work may regain the kind of respect-
ability it once enjoyed during the mid-1950's.
136 THE TENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COM-
MUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 34 (1973) (Documents);
DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S
CONGRESS, supra note 3, at 63-64.
137 For instance, in a speech on December 25, 1976,
Hua Kuo-feng said that "we must follow the policy
of building our country and running all our enter-
prises diligently and thriftily, rely on the masses,
systematize national rules and regulations, and im-
prove and strengthen socialist economic manage-
ment."
20 PEKING REv. 42 (No. 1, 1977.) The joint editorial
of the People's Daily, The Red Flag, and the Libera-
tion Army Daily on January 1, 1977 also stated,
We are certainly able to create a completely new
situation in which there are political liveliness
and economic prosperity, and in which a
hundred schools of thought contend and
hundred flowers blossom in science and culture,
and the people's livelihood steadily improve on
the basis of the development of production. We
will certainly be able to achieve the magnificent
goal of accomplishing the comprehensive mod-
ernization of agriculture, industry, national de-
fense, and science and technology and build
China into a powerful socialist country before
the end of the century.
20 PEKING REV. 42 (No. 1, 1977), at 47.
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